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I. Executive Summary 
 This study investigates the effect the 2008 economic crisis had on the relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance measures for S&P 500 financial companies.  
The findings assist S&P 500 financial companies to better determine compensation levels for 
CEOs by accounting for performance as well as account for the most recent valley in the 
economic cycle.  The study uses a database of CEO compensation data for S&P 500 financial 
firms from both before and after the crisis.  The database also contains firm performance data for 
the respective firms and years.  The relationship is explored using separate multiple regression 
models, then comparing the strength of relationship in 2007-2008 and 2011-2012.   
The results find a significant difference in Salary amounts from before and after the 
crisis. The p-stat and t-stat values the study uses in determining the significance of variables find 
the only significant variable tested to be the one representing the difference in Salary amounts 
from before and after the crisis.  Compared to other studies on similar topics, Revenues are 
decidedly less important in the S&P 500 financial sector than they are for other scopes of study 
as a whole.  The study also discovers an alarming disconnect between stock and investor returns 
and compensation amounts.   
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Study Design 
I. Introduction 
 This study illustrates the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance 
measures in S&P 500 financial companies.  The study investigates if this relationship is stronger 
or weaker before or after the most recent economic crisis of 2008.  In the years leading into the 
2008 crisis and since, there have been many public discussions about CEO compensation and its 
relative “fairness.”  This “fairness” refers to the fact everyone’s pay is related to:  
a) The amount of hours they work.  
b) The results they achieve. 
This seems a slightly simplistic view; however most hold it to be true.  Based upon this, 
CEO’s have their pay tied to both of the points listed above.   
 A complicating issue is a CEO’s job description.  They are responsible for operations of 
entire companies which span across the United States as well as abroad.  How are they supposed 
to have their performance measured?   
The most concrete answer to this question is firm performance numbers such as ROE, 
ROA, net margin, etc.  These are the most effective measures of performance because they are 
uniformly measured.  With the accounting rules and regulations of GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles) in place each of these measures are calculated the same way ending with 
the same results no matter who does the calculation.  Therefore, this study uses return on equity 
(ROE), annual investor returns, net margin, earnings per share (EPS), and gross revenues as its 
measures for performance.  
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Once the relationship between these variables and CEO compensation is determined, the 
study then compares the strength of this relationship pre-crisis to the strength of the relationship 
post-crisis.  This allows for it to be determined if compensation was reigned in from its pre-
crisis, higher levels to lower levels after the crisis in order to adjust for the poor management 
decisions which contributed to the crisis. 
II. Literature Review  
 Many attempts have been made trying to determine the best measures of the relationship 
between CEO compensation and various firm performance measures.  These attempts differ by 
which statistical tests are used, how compensation is measured, and which performance measures 
are chosen.   
One point agreed upon by most sources is the basic relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance measures, regardless of which measures are used, differs 
depending upon how it is approached.  Simply because a measure, such as revenue, is not 
strongly related to executive compensation in one industry or sector does not mean it will not be 
very strongly related to executive compensation in another sector or industry.  It all depends on 
the scope and area of focus. 
 In a 2001 study, Duru and Iyengar find bonuses and equity-based pay are more strongly 
related to accounting measures similar to those this study uses, while salary and long-term 
compensation are better tied to firm market performance.  This supports the choice of the 
performance measures this study uses since it concerns itself with the short-term. 
 Conyon and Lerong in a 2008 paper find companies in which the CEO holds another 
position among the board or executives paid their CEOs more while those in which the CEO did 
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not hold another position paid the CEOs less.  This study notes if each CEO holds one or more 
positions with their company.  However, it does not study the effects of this due to the fact the 
majority of financial sector CEOs in the S&P 500 hold more than one position or title with their 
company.  Since it applies to the majority of this study’s area of focus an adjustment seems 
unnecessary.   
 In a 2011 study Luo and Jackson conduct a similar study to this one to determine the 
similarities and differences in the same relationship between CEO compensation and 
performance measures in Chinese and American financial companies.  They conclude the 
relationship between compensation and revenues is similar between Chinese and American 
firms.  Their study provides much assistance in determining how to setup the models which this 
study uses. 
 In a 2010 test Marin runs 5 separate measures in relationship to CEO compensation 
including earnings per share (EPS), return on assets (ROA), shareholder’s equity, stock price, 
and firm size.  Marin finds firm size has the strongest relationship with CEO compensation of all 
variables he tested.  This study tests two of these measures, EPS and stock price.  The rest of the 
measures Marin tests are considered but determined to not be significantly related due to Marin’s 
previous work. 
 Dikolli, Hofman, and Pfeiffer (2012) conclude performance measures are slightly 
stronger when using a netted measure for executive compensation.  This adjustment is not made 
in this study because CEO compensation is part of the cost of conducting business.  Netting CEO 
compensation from a firm’s performance is like netting the rest of employee pay from firm 
performance.  Although it would possibly help strengthen the relationship between CEO 
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compensation and firm performance measures, this study does not net CEO compensation from 
the firm performance measure data. 
 In 2010 Cooper, Gulen, and Rau attempt to determine the relationship between CEO 
compensation and investor returns and find they are inversely related.  This study notes Cooper, 
Gulen, and Rau’s work and includes investor returns due to the significant relationship, although 
inverse. 
 Overall, there are many studies concerning the relation of CEO compensation to any 
number of performance measures.  Although the relationships, adjustments, and areas of focus 
differ they all contribute to the research being conducted in this field.  This study’s contribution 
to the field is the inclusion of economic crises as determining factors in the strength of the 
relationship between CEO compensation and performance measures. 
 
III. Research Objectives 
A. Explore the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance measures 
in S&P 500 financial firms from both 2007 and 2011. 
B. Compare the strength of this relationship in 2007 and 2011. 
C. Conclude if CEO compensation is drawn back to adjust for poor decisions which 
contribute to the 2008 financial crisis. 
IV. Research Design 
 This study investigates the strength of relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance.  It then determines if the relationship changed after the 2008 financial crisis. 
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 The hypotheses are as follows:  
H10:  There is no relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance measures. 
H1A:  There is a relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance measures. 
 
H20:  There is no difference in the relationship of the CEO compensation and firm performance 
measures in 2007 and 2011. 
H2A:  There is a difference between the relationship of the CEO compensation and firm 
performance measures in 2007 and 2011. 
   
Compensation is defined thusly: 
a) Total Cash Compensation (Salary) – the CEO’s base salary  
b) Total Compensation (Total) – the CEO’s total amount earned through all 
compensation methods  
Following are the performance measures which the model uses: 
1) Return on equity (ROE) 
2) Annual investor returns 
3) Net margin 
4) Earnings per share (EPS) 
5) Gross revenues 
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The strength of the relationship is determined by running multiple regression models 
which include both the 2007-2008 data sets and the 2011-2012 data sets.  Once the models are 
run the t-stat and p-stat values are compared in order to determine the effects the crisis had on the 
strength of relationship overall as well as for each individual variable tested.  The model reveals 
any significant changes in the relationships between the firm performance measures and CEO 
compensation as well as if such relationships changed due to the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
V. Data Sources 
 The primary sources used by the study are the firm performance measures and the CEO 
compensation data.  Examples of these measures can be found in Tables 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 in 
the appendix.  The CEO compensation data is gathered from salary.com along with 
usatoday.com for the 2011 and 2007 data respectively.  Usatoday.com is used to gather further 
2008 compensation data while salary.com is also be used to gather further 2012 compensation 
data. The firm performance measures are gathered from wikinvest.com and yahoo.com.  For the 
literature review a majority of the sources are secondary.  Most sources used are other papers 
written on similar topics, either determining the relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm performance or studying the effects different actions and measures have on the relationship.   
 
VI. Statistical Tests 
 For the statistical analysis of this study, separate multiple regression models are run.  
Each model attempts to define in more detail the relationships between firm performance 
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measures and CEO compensation.  All models attempt to relate the compensation levels to the 
firm performance measures listed previously: 
1) Return on equity (ROE) 
2) Annual investor returns 
3) Net margin 
4) Earnings per share (EPS) 
5) Gross revenues 
 Using the results of the various regression models the p-stat and t-stat values are 
compared to determine what affects the 2008 economic crisis had on the relationship between 
CEO compensation and firm performance measures.  These comparisons determine if poor 
performance of CEOs such as that leading to the 2008 economic crisis had a direct impact on 
their compensation for the period of time during or immediately after said performance. 
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Chapter 2: Data and Statistical Tests 
 In this chapter both the data and statistical tests shall be presented.  As previously stated 
the data contains both CEO compensation as well as firm performance measures.   
I. Raw Data 
Table 2-1 on page 54 of the appendix contains the raw data for all 2007 information 
collected.  There are seven different sets of data gathered from this year: Total Compensation, 
Salary, Return on Equity (ROE), Net Margin, Revenues, Earnings per Share (EPS), and the 
Annual Investor Return for the company’s stock in the given year.  The mean, or average, values 
are $18.91 million, 15.31%, 15.12%, -2.05%, $5.05, and $27.37 million for Total Compensation, 
ROE, Net Margin, Annual Investor Returns, Earnings per Share, and Revenues respectively.  
The standard deviation values are $27.87 million, 7.69%, 8.18%, 20.93%, $4.75, and $33.03 
million.  The median values are as follows: $11.447 million, 14%, 13%, -8%, $3.46, and $14.15 
million. These values along with the minimum and maximum values are shown in Table 2-17 
below and on page 51: 
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Table 2-17 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$2.321 million $170.699 
million 
$18.91 
million 
$27.87 
million 
$11.44 
million 
ROE 3% 37% 15.31% $7.69% 14.00% 
Net Margin 2% 44% 15.12% 8.18% 13.00% 
Annual 
Investor 
Returns 
-45% 41% -2.05% 20.93% -8.00% 
EPS $0.72 $29.20 $5.05 $4.75 $3.46 
Revenues $1.76 million $159.23 
million 
$27.37 
million 
$33.03 
million 
$14.15 
million 
 
 
Table 2-2 on page 56 in the appendix contains the raw data for all 2011 information 
gathered.  This table is made of the same types of data as Table 2-1 but gathered from the year 
2011 instead of 2007.  The mean, or average, values are $113.152 million, 11.47%, 13.12%, -
13.49%, $4.038, and $24.39 million for Total Compensation, ROE, Net Margin, Annual Investor 
Returns, Earnings per Share, and Revenues respectively.  The standard deviation values are 
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$56.576 million, 9.94%, 13.11%, 21.87%, $4.537, and $28.66 million.  The median values are 
$10.018 million, 10%, 12%, -12%, $3.07, and $12.56 million.  These values along with the 
minimum and maximum values are shown in Table 2-18 on page 52 and below: 
Table 2-18 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$.000001 
million (1 
dollar) 
$24.559 
million 
$113.152 
million 
$56.57 
million 
$10.02 
million 
ROE -2% 46% 11.47% 9.94% 10.00% 
Net Margin -15% 57% 13.12% 13.11% 12.00% 
Annual 
Investor 
Returns 
-60% 451% -13.49% 21.87% -12.00% 
EPS -$0.53 $27.28 $4.03 $4.53 $3.07 
Revenues $1.76 million $115.37 
million 
$24.39 
million 
$28.66 
million 
$12.56 
million 
 
Table 2-3 on page 58 in the appendix contains the compensation data gathered from the 
year 2008.  This table includes Total Compensation along with Salary for each CEO for the year 
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2008. The mean, or average, values are $9.644 million and $0.925 million for Total 
Compensation and Salary respectively. The standard deviation values are $7.525 million and 
$0.281 million respectively.  The median values are $8.293 million and $0.994 million.  The 
minimum and maximum values are as follows on Table 2-19 from page 53 in the appendix: 
Table 2-19 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$8.293 million $27.327 
million 
$9.64 
million 
$7.53 
million 
$8.29 
million 
Salary $0.994 million $1.338 million $0.93 
million 
$0.28 
million 
$0.99 
million 
 
Table 2-4 on page 59 in the appendix contains the compensation data gathered from the 
year 2012.  This table includes the same two categories as Table 2-3 but is gathered from 2012 
instead of 2008. The mean, or average, values are $9.123 million and $3.890 million for Total 
Compensation and Salary respectively.  The standard deviation values are $8.100 million and 
$1.932 million. The median values are $6.545 million and $3.791 million. The minimum and 
maximum values are in Table-20 below as well as on page 53 in the appendix: 
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Table 2-20 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$0.160 million $41.990 
million 
$9.12 
million 
$8.10 
million 
$6.54 
million 
Salary $0 $8.975 million $3.89 
million 
$1.93 
million 
$3.79 
million 
 
II. Regression Results 
The first regression model ran the 2007 and 2011 data for Total Compensation and the 
firm performance measures.  The results can be seen below in Table 2-5 and on page 45 in the 
appendix.   
 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
11166544 
 
5718583 
 
  1.95 
 
  0.055 
 
ROE 
 
7886119 
 
28216655 
 
0.28 
 
  0.781 
 
Net Margin 
 
-17843925 
 
 
26627182 
 
 
  -0.67 
 
 
  0.505 
Annual Investor 
Return 
-4123386 11619248   -0.35 0.724 
 
EPS 
   694486     601325 1.15   0.252 
 
Revenues 
    
    78555 
      
    84425 
 
    0.93 
  
  0.355 
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As seen from the p-stat and t-stat values none of the variables are significant other than 
the constant.  The regression equation is: 
 
Total Compensation = 11,166,540 + 7,886,119 ROE – 17,843,925 Net Margin 
                     - 4,123,386 Annual Investor Return + 694,486 EPS 
                     + 78,555 Revenues 
 
The formula has a standard deviation of $20.364 million for Total Compensation. The 
model finds from the coefficients Net Margin has the largest impact on Total Compensation 
while Revenues have the least.  The adjusted r
2
 value of 0.0% shows the line of best fit actually 
does not fit well at all however.   
The outliers and reasons they are removed from the data are as follows: 
1. Prologis is outside the normal curve in the category ‘2007 Net Margin’ as seen in 
Table 2-A 
2. Goldman Sachs is outside the normal curve in the category ‘2007 EPS’ as seen in 
Table 2-B 
3. Vornado Realty Trust is outside the normal curve in the category ‘2012 Total 
Compensation’ as seen in Table 2-C 
4. Franklin Resources is outside the normal curve in the category ‘2011 ROE’ as seen in 
Table 2-D 
5. T. Rowe Price is outside the normal curve in the category ‘2011 ROE’ as seen in 
Table 2-D 
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6. CME Group is outside the normal curve in the categories ‘2011 Net Margin’ and 
‘2011 EPS’ as seen in Table 2-E and Table 2-F respectively 
7. Bank of America is outside the normal curve in the category ‘2011 Revenues’ as seen 
in Table 2-G 
8. Citigroup is outside the normal curve in the category ‘2011 Salary’ with a value of 
$1.00. 
9. Aon lacks accurate compensation data 
10. Charles Schwab lacks accurate compensation data 
11. ACE Limited lacks accurate compensation data 
 
Below is Table 2-A, an example of the graphs used to determine the outliers above.  
Table 2-A and the remaining outlier graphs are available in the appendix beginning on page 41. 
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Once the results from the first regression are analyzed, the second regression runs the 
same model but with the outliers removed.  At this point the data appears as represented in Table 
2-6 (page 45) below.   
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
9,941,680 
 
9,035,879 
 
  1.10 
 
 0.276 
 
ROE 
 
5,672,133 
 
46,292,057 
 
0.12 
 
  0.903 
 
Net Margin 
 
-5,021,656 
 
 
44,015,543 
 
 
  -0.11 
 
 
  0.910 
Annual Investor 
Return 
-13,278,842 15,534,633   -0.85 0.396 
 
EPS 
   755,285     1,565,878 0.48   0.632 
 
Revenues 
    
    75,695 
      
    113,865 
 
    0.66 
  
  0.509 
 
From the results it is apparent none of the variables are significant.   
The regression equation is: 
 
Total Compensation = 9,941,680 + 5,672,133 ROE – 5,021,656 Net Margin 
                     - 13,278,842 Annual Investor Return + 755,285 EPS 
                     + 75,695 Revenues 
 The formula has a standard deviation of $22.615 million of Total Compensation.  The 
coefficients show Annual Investor Returns has the largest, and inverse, impact on Total 
Compensation while Revenues has the smallest.  The adjusted r
2 
value of 0.0% shows the line 
fits no better than the first model and does not fit well at all. 
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 Once the second regression is completed, the third is run offsetting the firm performance 
measures and compensation data by one year.  This allows the firm performance data from 2007 
and 2011 to predict the compensation in 2008 and 2012 respectively.  This is done in order to 
allow the model to ‘determine’ compensation amounts.  The same methods are used to determine 
if there are any additional outliers due to the change.  One additional outlier, Vornado Realty 
Trust, is found in the new category of ‘2012 Total Compensation.’  The additional data which is 
added to the regression is shown Tables 2-3 and 2-4 on pages 58-59 in the appendix.  Once the 
additional outlier is discovered and removed, the new regression results are shown on Table 2-7 
below as well as on page 46 in the appendix. 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
2,660,769 
 
2,094,427 
 
  1.27 
 
 0.209 
 
ROE 
 
44,648,038 
 
10,766,015 
 
4.15 
 
  0.000 
 
Net Margin 
 
-9,759,132 
 
 
10,215,722 
 
 
  -0.96 
 
 
  0.344 
Annual Investor 
Return 
4,377,368 3,601,568   1.22 0.230 
 
EPS 
   274,321     366,077 0.75   0.457 
 
Revenues 
    
    -28,131 
      
    26,432 
 
    -1.06 
  
  0.292 
 
By looking at the p-stat and t-stat values once again it is determined all variables except 
ROE are insignificant while ROE had strong value of T = 4.15 and p = .000.   
The regression equation is: 
Total Compensation = 2,660,769 + 44,648,038 ROE – 9,759,132 Net Margin 
                     + 4,377,368 Annual Investor Return + 274,321 EPS 
                     - 28,131 Revenues  
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The formula has a standard deviation of $5.242 million in Total Compensation.  From the 
coefficient values the study determines ROE has the largest effect of Total Compensation while 
Revenues has the smallest. The adjusted r
2
 value of 29.5% shows an improvement in the 
relationships strength. 
 After the previous results are determined the study decides it worthwhile to determine if 
there is a significant difference between any of the variable values from 2007/2008 and 
2011/2012.  To do so an additional six variables are added into the regression.  Each variable is 
comprised of the previous values such as Total Compensation or ROE, then multiplied by a 
dummy variable of 0 or 1 representing 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 respectively.  The new layout 
of the data can be found on Table 2-8 on page 60 in the appendix.  The corresponding regression 
results are on Table 2-9 below and on page 47. 
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Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
2,660,769 
 
2,094,427 
 
  1.27 
 
 0.209 
 
ROE 
 
44,648,038 
 
10,766,015 
 
4.15 
 
  0.000 
 
Net Margin 
 
-9,759,132 
 
 
10,215,722 
 
 
  -0.96 
 
 
  0.344 
Annual Investor 
Return 
4,377,368 3,601,568   1.22 0.230 
 
EPS 
   274,321     366,077 0.75   0.457 
 
Revenues 
    
    -28,131 
      
    26,432 
 
    -1.06 
  
  0.292 
 
Change in 
Compensation 
 
3,840,636 
 
4,610,505 
 
0.83 
 
0.409 
 
Change in ROE 
 
-54,555,433 
 
22,128,943 
 
  -2.47 
 
 0.017 
 
Change in Net Margin 
 
-30,016,180 
 
24,086,869 
 
-1.25 
 
  0.219 
 
Change in Annual 
Investor Return 
 
-4,007,479 
 
 
6,839,951 
 
 
  -0.59 
 
 
  0.561 
Change in EPS 385,661 704,609   0.55 0.587 
 
Change in Revenues 
   46,412    52,371 0.89   0.380 
 
From the resulting t-stat and p-stat values the variable ROE is significant and has the only 
significant difference from one data set to another.  The remaining variables are weak in 
strength.   
The regression equation is 
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Total Compensation = - 64,988 + 55,412,405 ROE + 22,568,220 Net Margin 
                     + 7,857,096 Annual Investor Return – 18,581 EPS 
                     - 29,135 Revenues + 3,840,636 Change in Compensation 
 – 54,555,433 Change in ROE 
                     - 30,016,180 Change in Net Margin 
                     - 4,007,479 Change in Annual Investor Return + 385,661 Change in EPS 
                     + 46,412 Change in Revenues 
 
The equation has a standard deviation of $4.726 million for Total Compensation.  The 
coefficient values show ROE and EPS respectively have the largest and smallest impacts on 
Total Compensation. The adjusted r
2
 value of 42.7% shows a much stronger relationship overall. 
 At this point an attempt to simplify the regressions and drill down into what truly are the 
best determinants of CEO compensation is undertaken.  A few separate models are conceived, 
each with slight differences from one another, in an attempt to tweak the results and see what can 
be found.  One regression is tested using the difference between the two data sets of firm 
performance measures.  An example is Bank of America’s Total Compensation being 
$2,000,000 in 2008 and $5,500,000 in 2012.  The regression would then use the difference of the 
values, which is $3,500,000 (5,500,000 – 2,000,000 = 3,500,000).  Another model attempts 
making Total Compensation and Revenues into one variable since other literature has already 
proven a significant relationship between the two.  This is done by creating a ratio of Total 
Compensation divided by Revenues to represent compensation per dollar of revenues earned.  
Finally, it is decided to rerun the previous models but with Salary in place of Total 
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Compensation.  This is done since other published studies have shown there is a significant 
difference in the relationships of firm performance measures and Salary or Total Compensation 
 The regression using the difference between data sets is run using the same outliers as 
previously determined.  Table 2-10 (page 62) displays the new data set while Table 2-11 (page 
48) below displays the regression results.   
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
-1,364 
 
1,995 
 
  -0.68 
 
  0.501 
 
ROE 
 
9,455 
 
19,034 
 
0.50 
 
  0.624 
 
Net Margin 
 
-9,918 
 
 
18,565 
 
 
  -0.53 
 
 
  0.598 
Annual Investor 
Return 
-1,100 6,125   -0.18 0.859 
 
EPS 
   -676.8     751.8 -0.90   0.377 
 
Revenues 
    
    0.00023 
      
    0.00006 
 
    3.66 
  
  0.001 
 
From the p and t stats Revenues are found to be very significant while the other variables 
are very weak.   
The regression equation is: 
Total Compensation (in 1000s) = - 1364 + 9455 ROE - 9918 Net Margin 
                                - 1100 Annual Investor Return - 677 EPS 
                                + 0.000233 Revenues (in 1000s) 
The formula has a standard deviation 9,429.95 thousands of dollars for Total 
Compensation.  From the coefficient values of -9,918 for Net Margin and 0.000233 for Revenues 
it is apparent these two variables have the largest and smallest effects on Total Compensation.  
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This result shows the model based upon the differences is closer to what other studies see in 
terms of the Revenue to Total Compensation relationship than the other models this study runs. 
 The regression using the new ratio of compensation per revenue dollars earned has the 
outlay shown in Table 2-12 (page 63) and the results shown in Table 2-13 below and also on 
page 48 in the appendix. 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
0.00146 
 
0.00043 
 
  -0.68 
 
  0.501 
 
ROE 
 
-0.00552 
 
0.00231 
 
0.50 
 
  0.624 
 
Net Margin 
 
0.00845 
 
 
0.00197 
 
 
  -0.53 
 
 
  0.598 
Annual Investor 
Return 
0.00001 0.00073   -0.18 0.859 
 
EPS 
   -0.00012     0.00007 -0.90   0.377 
 
Revenues 
    
    -0.00000 
      
    0.00000 
 
    3.66 
  
  0.001 
 
Change in Ratio 
 
-0.00025 
 
0.00030 
 
-0.84 
 
0.407 
 
These results are found using the same outliers as before.  By looking at the p-stat and t-
stat values once again it is determined the variables ROE, Margin, EPS, and Revenues along 
with the constant are all significant.  This lack of relationship to Annual Investor Returns shows 
an alarming disconnect or lack of relationship between CEO compensation package alignments 
and investors’ goals.  
 The regression equation is: 
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Total Comp/Revenue Ratio = 0.00146 - 0.00552 ROE + 0.00846 Net Margin 
                           + 0.000018 Annual Investor Return - 0.000129 EPS 
                           - 0.000000 Revenues (in 1000s) - 0.000257 Change in Ratio 
The equation has a standard deviation of 0.0001 units of the ratio created.  Net Margin is 
found to have the largest impact on the Total Compensation to Revenue ratio.  On the other 
hand, Revenues are found to have the least impact on the ratio. The adjusted r
2
 value of 34.3% 
shows a somewhat weak overall fit but does show the surprising lack of investor returns 
importance to CEOs and their compensation packages. 
 When running some of the previous regressions with Salary replacing Total 
Compensation, the study comes to the conclusion Net Margin is insignificant.  Therefore, Net 
Margin is not a part of any of the modified regressions.  The study conducts the regression of 
Salary and Total Compensation vs. ROE, EPS, Annual Investor Returns, Revenues, and a 
dummy variable for each determinant.  The study also conducts the regression using the 
difference between the two data sets with Salary and Total Compensation vs. ROE, EPS, Annual 
Investor Returns, and Revenues. 
 The results for the regression of Salary and the firm performance measures with dummy 
variables can be seen in Table 2-14 below and on page 49. 
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Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
968.4 
 
714.1 
 
  1.36 
 
 0.181 
 
ROE 
 
1,851 
 
3,642 
 
0.51 
 
  0.614 
 
Annual Investor 
Return 
 
-95 
 
 
1,434 
 
 
  -0.07 
 
 
  0.948 
EPS -24.8 123.6   -0.20 0.842 
 
Revenues (in 1000s) 
   -0.000002     0.000007 -0.29   0.775 
 
Change in 
Compensation 
    
    2,826.10 
      
    909.5 
 
    3.11 
  
  0.003 
 
Change in ROE 
 
1,381 
 
6,545 
 
0.21 
 
0.834 
 
Change in Annual 
Investor Return 
 
-1,596 
 
1,953 
 
  -0.82 
 
 0.418 
 
Change in EPS 
 
-233.8 
 
191.3 
 
-1.22 
 
  0.228 
 
Change in Revenues 
 
26.1 
 
 
14.07 
 
 
  1.86 
 
 
  0.070 
 
Looking at the p-stat and t-stat values it is determined there is a significant difference in 
the Salary amounts as well as in Revenues.   
The regression equation is 
Salary (in 1000s) = 968 + 1851 ROE - 95 Annual Investor Return - 25 EPS 
                     - 0.000002 Revenues (in 1000s) + 2826 Change in Compensation 
                     + 1381 Change in ROE - 1596 Change in Annual Investor Return 
- 234 Change in EPS + 26.1 Change in Revenues 
The formula has a standard deviation of 1,406.88 thousands of dollars for Salary.  The 
largest effect on the equation is caused by the variable representing the difference between the 
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pre-crisis and post-crisis data sets.  The smallest influence in the model is from Revenues.  The 
adjusted r
2
 value of 51.9% shows it is more accurate than any other model which has been run by 
this study. 
 The results for the regression of Total Compensation and the firm performance measures 
with dummy variables can be seen in Table 2-15 below as well as on page 50. 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
7,744 
 
3,700 
 
2.09 
 
 0.042 
 
ROE 
 
19,486 
 
18,871 
 
1.03 
 
  0.307 
 
Annual Investor 
Return 
 
-8,883 
 
 
7,429 
 
 
  -1.20 
 
 
  0.238 
EPS -388.1 640.6   -0.61 0.548 
 
Revenues (in 1000s) 
   0.00001     0.00003 0.45   0.657 
 
Change in 
Compensation 
    
    1,512 
      
    4,713 
 
    0.32 
  
  0.750 
 
Change in ROE 
 
-58,013 
 
33,915 
 
-1.71 
 
0.094 
 
Change in Annual 
Investor Returns 
 
26,940 
 
10,122 
 
  2.66 
 
 0.011 
 
Change in EPS 
 
-39.7 
 
991.2 
 
-0.04 
 
  0.968 
 
Change in Revenues 
 
294.14 
 
 
72.88 
 
 
4.04 
 
 
  0.000 
 
Looking at the p-stat and t-stat values it is determined only the Revenues, ROE, and 
Annual Investor Return amounts differed significantly, though with no strong relationship to 
Total Compensation. 
The regression equation is: 
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Total Compensation (in 1000s) = 7744 + 19486 ROE - 8883 Annual 
Investor Return 
                                 - 388 EPS + 0.000016 Revenues (in 1000s) 
                                 + 1512 Change in Compensation - 58013 Change in ROE 
                                 + 26940 Change in Annual Investor Returns 
-  40 Change in EPS + 294 Change in Revenues 
The equation has a standard deviation of 7,289.79 thousands of dollars in Total 
Compensation.  The largest impact arises from the variable representing the difference in Annual 
Investor Returns from one data set to another.  The smallest impact comes from the difference in 
EPS from the pre-crisis data set to the post-crisis data set.  The adjusted r
2
 value of 17.5% shows 
the equation is not an accurate predictor of Total Compensation. 
The results for the regression of the difference between the two data sets with Salary and 
the firm performance measures can be seen in Table 2-16 below and on page 50 of the appendix.   
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
2,842.3 
 
386.4 
 
7.36 
 
 0.000 
 
ROE 
 
247 
 
3,438 
 
0.07 
 
  0.943 
 
Annual Investor 
Return 
 
-1,395 
 
 
1,171 
 
 
  -1.19 
 
 
  0.245 
EPS -137.6 147.4   -0.93 0.360 
 
Revenues (in 1000s) 
   0.00001     0.00001 0.91   0.373 
 
Looking at the p-stat and t-stat values it is seen no significant relationship exists at all.  
Not a single test variable is significant and the adjusted r
2
 value is 0.0%.  
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The regression equation is: 
 
Salary (in 1000s) = 2842 + 247 ROE - 1395 Annual Investor Return - 138 EPS 
+ 0.000011 Revenues (in 1000s) 
 
The formula has a standard deviation of 1,850.21 thousands of dollars in Salary.  While 
Annual Investor Returns have the largest impact in this model, Revenues have the smallest. The 
adjusted r
2
 value of 0.0% shows the equation is not an accurate predictor of Total Compensation. 
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Chapter 3: Results and Interpretations 
 After running numerous regressions attempting to discover if there are any models which 
are more accurate than others when investigating the relationship between CEO compensation 
and their firms’ performances, the study finds there are none which fit better than others.  The 
study concludes of all the models run, the results on Tables 2-14 and 2-15 (page 49-50) and their 
adjusted r
2
 values are the ones most likely to match what is expected to occur by real life 
investors. 
From the results in Chapter 2 it is found throughout the different setups of regressions the 
variable Net Margin, which in the beginning is considered significant, is actually very 
insignificant.  This can be proven by the p-stat and t-stat values found in the following models: 
 Total Compensation vs. Firm Performance Measures with dummies (Table 2-9, page 
33) (t-stat = -1.25) (p-stat = 0.219) 
 Difference Between Salary Data Sets vs Firm Performance Measures (Table 2-11, 
page 35) (t-stat = -0.53) (p-stat = 0.598) 
 Total Compensation vs Firm Performance Measures without dummies (Table 2-7, 
page 32) (t-stat = -0.96) (p-stat = 0.344) 
 
From these results and others present in the appendix, CEO compensation is definitively 
not determined in any way, shape, or form by the Net Margin of a firm.  Once the study 
concludes this variable is insignificant it removes Net Margin from the final statistical tests to 
avoid any correlation error which might occur in the r
2
 and adjusted-r
2
 values which the study 
uses as the final determinant for the existence of a relationship. 
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In Tables 2-14 and 2-15 (page 49-50) the statistical results with the removal of Net 
Margin can be seen.  The effect is a significant increase in the strength of relationship between 
the firm performance measures and salary while the relationship with Total Compensation 
weakens slightly. 
I. Revenues 
The effect Revenues has on the models represented by Tables 2-14 and 2-15 (page 49-50) 
is negligible.  Not only are the values 0.00001 and -0.000002 respectively, but the t-stat and p-
stat values show they are insignificant as well. Although the study does not confirm the findings 
from other studies in terms of Revenues’ significance with the t-stat and p-stat values, there is a 
significant difference discovered in the relationship between compensation and revenues from 
2007 to 2011.  The study expects to see such a result as numerous other studies on such similar 
topics conclude and affirm many times over Revenues are most likely the strongest determinant 
of any CEO’s compensation.  This is noted in Chapter 1 in the Literature Review with an article 
from Marin in 2010.  This relationship is very strong since revenues are typically a very good 
indicator of firm size which logically has a significant effect on how much a firm’s CEO earns.  
Since a CEO’s job is to oversee an entire corporation, it takes more time and effort to run a larger 
company. Therefore, CEOs of larger firms deserve higher compensation amounts.  
II. Difference between Data Sets  
The most significant variable identified is the difference between the two data sets.  The 
study finds there is a significant difference in Salary amounts from 2008 to 2012.  In the model 
using Salary (Table 2-14, page 49) as the measurement of compensation this difference has the 
largest effect or coefficient on the amount of Salary as well.  This shows there is a significant 
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difference in Salary amounts before and after the economic crisis. This finding is important for 
the study since the primary hypothesis is to determine if the 2008 financial crisis had an effect on 
this exact measure.  This confirms the assumption that since the economic crisis is considered to 
have been caused by the financial industry the responsible firms’ CEOs had their compensation 
models changed or reduced. 
III. Annual Investor Returns  
The results for Annual Investor Returns are mixed.  In terms of the relationship between 
returns and Salary the correlation is poor.  From the t-stat = -0.07 and p-stat = 0.948 from Table 
2-14 (page 49) it is seen there is almost no relationship at all.  However, when the study looks at 
the same relationship using Total Compensation instead of Salary, it becomes much stronger, 
though still technically speaking statistically insignificant.  From the p-stat = 0.238 and t-stat = -
1.20 from Table 2-15 (page 50) the study concludes this difference arises from the differences 
between Salary and Total Compensation.  Total Compensation includes Bonuses and Other 
Compensation which Salary excludes.  Bonuses, since Other Compensation is very small in 
almost every case, are therefore very significantly tied to the previous year’s Annual Investor 
Returns.  These findings are significant since, according to most companies and their description 
for CEO compensation packages, one of the highest priorities is aligning CEO goals with 
shareholder goals.  This is logical and expected to be seen as other studies have published similar 
findings.   
IV. Return on Equity  
The results for Return on Equity (ROE) for the most part are similar when tested in 
relationship to either Salary or Total Compensation.  From the t-stat = 0.51 and 1.03 and p-stat = 
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0.614 and 0.307 for Salary and Total Compensation respectively (Table 2-14, page 49)(Table 2-
15, page 50), it is seen there is no significant relationship, although it is more noticeable than Net 
Margin.  This variable is included in the study for similar reasons to which Annual Investor 
Returns are included.  Where Annual Investor Return is deemed an appropriate measure to 
determine if a CEO’s performance is good or bad for investors, ROE is deemed an appropriate 
measure to determine a CEO’s performance relative to returns on intra-firm projects.  The only 
significant discovery during the testing is the relationship between ROE and Total Compensation 
changes from 2008 to 2012.  However, this change does not take place in relationship to Salary. 
V. Earnings per Share 
The results for Earnings per Share (EPS) are found to be statistically insignificant as seen 
from the values of t-stat = -0.20 and -0.61 and p-stat = 0.842 and 0.548 from Tables 2-14 and 2-
15 (page 49-50) for both Salary and Total Compensation respectively.  This result is somewhat 
surprising considering what an important measure EPS is of a company in the field of Finance.  
EPS is included in the study due to its trait of being a measure of overall firm profitability as 
well as a measure which is important in many investor valuation models.  Having such a position 
of importance the study believes EPS is an important input or determinant in a CEO 
compensation package formula or model. 
VI. Summary 
 Overall, although the study finds individual variables either significant or insignificant, 
the ending adjusted-r
2
 values show just how well the entire models fit.  For the regression model 
using Salary (Table 2-14) (page 49) the results find an adjusted-r
2 
value of 51.9% while for Total 
Compensation the results (Table 2-15) (page 50) come to a value of 17.5%.  This shows the 
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model using the variables of ROE, EPS, Annual Investor Returns, and Revenues as determinants 
for CEO compensation is a much better predictor of base Salary than of Total Compensation.  As 
previously mentioned, the primary difference in the relationships is Total Compensation includes 
both the Bonuses and Other categories of compensation while Salary ignores them.  Bonuses 
seem to be much more volatile year-to-year and tied much more strongly to stock performance 
than Salary, which is tied more strongly to firm size per the Revenues variable than anything else 
discovered. 
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Chapter 4: Summary and Conclusions 
From the statistical tests run the study concludes that of the various measurements, the 
regression models are much better predictors of Salary amounts than of Total Compensation.  
The study also discovers an alarming disconnect between Annual Investor Returns, the variable 
used to represent investor interests, and its ability to accurately predict compensation.  Although 
still not a significant predictor in either model, the large difference in the statistical relationship 
found between Annual Investor Returns and Salary or Total Compensation shows Bonuses, the 
input ignored in the measurement of Salary, is much more strongly tied to investor goals. 
The results from models testing the difference in variables from one data set to another in 
terms of total amounts see significant changes in Salary as well as the relationship between 
Bonuses and Annual Investor Returns.  Salaries grow by four times, much larger than the rate the 
economy grows in the equivalent timeframe.  The amount of input Annual Investor Returns has 
is much stronger when related to a compensation method which includes bonuses.  This change 
suggests stockholders in the time of crisis might have begun rewarding CEOs in larger amounts 
for better stock returns. 
In future attempts to determine CEO compensation for any given year the study suggests 
including the variable Revenue.  Also, the study recommends including Annual Investor Returns 
if ‘Bonuses’ are included within the compensation measurement.  The models also suggest not 
including Net Margin while investigating further EPS and ROE as determinants of compensation 
as the study finds them to be statistically insignificant during the time horizon of study. 
The overall inability to accurately predict a CEO’s compensation based upon the majority 
of uniformly measured statistics among companies is worrying.  How such a large amount of 
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cash and value is paid to one person, the CEO, is a decision the public feels can and should be 
done in a publicly uniform manner.  This would cause less controversy when companies begin 
doing poorly and CEO compensation amounts begin to come into question.  Shareholders 
deserve to know if a company which they invest in is responsibly dispersing funds not only to its 
shareholders and employees but also the officers of the company. 
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Appendix 
Section 1:  Outlier Graphs 
Table 2-A 
2007 Net Margin 
Prologis is the company outside the curve; it is slight however with a value of 0.437. 
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Table 2-B 
2007 EPS 
Goldman Sachs is the outlier here with a value of $29.20.
 
Table 2-C 
2012 Compensation 
Here we can see one outlier, Vornado Realty Trust, with a value of $64,400,000. 
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Table 2-D 
2011 ROE 
Both Franklin Resources and T. Rowe Price are outside the curve with values of .46 and .45 respectively. 
 
Table 2-E 
2011 Net Margin 
CME is outside the curve with a value of 0.57. 
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Table 2-F 
2011 EPS 
CME is again outside the curve with a value of $27.28. 
 
Table 2-G 
2011 Revenues 
Bank of America is outside the curve here with a value of 115.37.
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Section 2:  Regression Results 
Table 2-5 
 
 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
11166544 
 
5718583 
 
  1.95 
 
  0.055 
 
ROE 
 
7886119 
 
28216655 
 
0.28 
 
  0.781 
 
Net Margin 
 
-17843925 
 
 
26627182 
 
 
  -0.67 
 
 
  0.505 
Annual Investor 
Return 
-4123386 11619248   -0.35 0.724 
 
EPS 
   694486     601325 1.15   0.252 
 
Revenues 
    
    78555 
      
    84425 
 
    0.93 
  
  0.355 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2-6 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
9,941,680 
 
9,035,879 
 
  1.10 
 
 0.276 
 
ROE 
 
5,672,133 
 
46,292,057 
 
0.12 
 
  0.903 
 
Net Margin 
 
-5,021,656 
 
 
44,015,543 
 
 
  -0.11 
 
 
  0.910 
Annual Investor 
Return 
-13,278,842 15,534,633   -0.85 0.396 
 
EPS 
   755,285     1,565,878 0.48   0.632 
 
Revenues 
    
    75,695 
      
    113,865 
 
    0.66 
  
  0.509 
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Table 2-7 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
2,660,769 
 
2,094,427 
 
  1.27 
 
 0.209 
 
ROE 
 
44,648,038 
 
10,766,015 
 
4.15 
 
  0.000 
 
Net Margin 
 
-9,759,132 
 
 
10,215,722 
 
 
  -0.96 
 
 
  0.344 
Annual Investor 
Return 
4,377,368 3,601,568   1.22 0.230 
 
EPS 
   274,321     366,077 0.75   0.457 
 
Revenues 
    
    -28,131 
      
    26,432 
 
    -1.06 
  
  0.292 
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Table 2-9 
 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
2,660,769 
 
2,094,427 
 
  1.27 
 
 0.209 
 
ROE 
 
44,648,038 
 
10,766,015 
 
4.15 
 
  0.000 
 
Net Margin 
 
-9,759,132 
 
 
10,215,722 
 
 
  -0.96 
 
 
  0.344 
Annual Investor 
Return 
4,377,368 3,601,568   1.22 0.230 
 
EPS 
   274,321     366,077 0.75   0.457 
 
Revenues 
    
    -28,131 
      
    26,432 
 
    -1.06 
  
  0.292 
 
Change in 
Compensation 
 
3,840,636 
 
4,610,505 
 
0.83 
 
0.409 
 
Change in ROE 
 
-54,555,433 
 
22,128,943 
 
  -2.47 
 
 0.017 
 
Change in Net Margin 
 
-30,016,180 
 
24,086,869 
 
-1.25 
 
  0.219 
 
Change in Annual 
Investor Return 
 
-4,007,479 
 
 
6,839,951 
 
 
  -0.59 
 
 
  0.561 
Change in EPS 385,661 704,609   0.55 0.587 
 
Change in Revenues 
   46,412    52,371 0.89   0.380 
 
  
48 
 
Table 2-11 
 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
-1,364 
 
1,995 
 
  -0.68 
 
  0.501 
 
ROE 
 
9,455 
 
19,034 
 
0.50 
 
  0.624 
 
Net Margin 
 
-9,918 
 
 
18,565 
 
 
  -0.53 
 
 
  0.598 
Annual Investor 
Return 
-1,100 6,125   -0.18 0.859 
 
EPS 
   -676.8     751.8 -0.90   0.377 
 
Revenues 
    
    0.00023 
      
    0.00006 
 
    3.66 
  
  0.001 
 
 
Table 2-13 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
0.00146 
 
0.00043 
 
  -0.68 
 
  0.501 
 
ROE 
 
-0.00552 
 
0.00231 
 
0.50 
 
  0.624 
 
Net Margin 
 
0.00845 
 
 
0.00197 
 
 
  -0.53 
 
 
  0.598 
Annual Investor 
Return 
0.00001 0.00073   -0.18 0.859 
 
EPS 
   -0.00012     0.00007 -0.90   0.377 
 
Revenues 
    
    -0.00000 
      
    0.00000 
 
    3.66 
  
  0.001 
 
Change in 
Compensation 
 
-0.00025 
 
0.00030 
 
-0.84 
 
0.407 
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Table 2-14 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
968.4 
 
714.1 
 
  1.36 
 
 0.181 
 
ROE 
 
1,851 
 
3,642 
 
0.51 
 
  0.614 
 
Annual Investor 
Return 
 
-95 
 
 
1,434 
 
 
  -0.07 
 
 
  0.948 
EPS -24.8 123.6   -0.20 0.842 
 
Revenues (in 1000s) 
   -0.000002     0.000007 -0.29   0.775 
 
Change in 
Compensation 
    
    2,826.10 
      
    909.5 
 
    3.11 
  
  0.003 
 
Change in ROE 
 
1,381 
 
6,545 
 
0.21 
 
0.834 
 
Change in Annual 
Investor Returns 
 
-1,596 
 
1,953 
 
  -0.82 
 
 0.418 
 
Change in EPS 
 
-233.8 
 
191.3 
 
-1.22 
 
  0.228 
 
Change in Revenues 
 
26.1 
 
 
14.07 
 
 
  1.86 
 
 
  0.070 
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Table 2-15 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
7,744 
 
3,700 
 
2.09 
 
 0.042 
 
ROE 
 
19,486 
 
18,871 
 
1.03 
 
  0.307 
 
Annual Investor 
Return 
 
-8,883 
 
 
7,429 
 
 
  -1.20 
 
 
  0.238 
EPS -388.1 640.6   -0.61 0.548 
 
Revenues (in 1000s) 
   0.00001     0.00003 0.45   0.657 
 
Change in 
Compensation 
    
    1,512 
      
    4,713 
 
    0.32 
  
  0.750 
 
Change in ROE 
 
-58,013 
 
33,915 
 
-1.71 
 
0.094 
 
Change in Annual 
Investor Returns 
 
26,940 
 
10,122 
 
  2.66 
 
 0.011 
 
Change in EPS 
 
-39.7 
 
991.2 
 
-0.04 
 
  0.968 
 
Change in Revenues 
 
294.14 
 
 
72.88 
 
 
4.04 
 
 
  0.000 
 
Table 2-16 
 
Predictor 
 
Coef 
 
SE Coef 
 
T 
 
P 
 
Constant 
 
2,842.3 
 
386.4 
 
7.36 
 
 0.000 
 
ROE 
 
247 
 
3,438 
 
0.07 
 
  0.943 
 
Annual Investor 
Return 
 
-1,395 
 
 
1,171 
 
 
  -1.19 
 
 
  0.245 
EPS -137.6 147.4   -0.93 0.360 
 
Revenues (in 1000s) 
   0.00001     0.00001 0.91   0.373 
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Section 3:  Raw Data Statistics 
Table 2-17 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$2.321 million $170.699 
million 
$18.91 
million 
$27.87 
million 
$11.44 
million 
ROE 3% 37% 15.31% $7.69% 14.00% 
Net Margin 2% 44% 15.12% 8.18% 13.00% 
Annual 
Investor 
Returns 
-45% 41% -2.05% 20.93% -8.00% 
EPS $0.72 $29.20 $5.05 $4.75 $3.46 
Revenues $1.76 million $159.23 
million 
$27.37 
million 
$33.03 
million 
$14.15 
million 
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Table 2-18 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$.000001 
million (1 
dollar) 
$24.559 
million 
$113.152 
million 
$56.57 
million 
$10.02 
million 
ROE -2% 46% 11.47% 9.94% 10.00% 
Net Margin -15% 57% 13.12% 13.11% 12.00% 
Annual 
Investor 
Returns 
-60% 451% -13.49% 21.87% -12.00% 
EPS -$0.53 $27.28 $4.03 $4.53 $3.07 
Revenues $1.76 million $115.37 
million 
$24.39 
million 
$28.66 
million 
$12.56 
million 
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Table 2-19 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$8.293 million $27.327 
million 
$9.64 
million 
$7.53 
million 
$8.29 
million 
Salary $0.994 million $1.338 million $0.93 
million 
$0.28 
million 
$0.99 
million 
 
 
Table 2-20 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median 
Total 
Compensation 
$0.160 million $41.990 
million 
$9.12 
million 
$8.10 
million 
$6.54 
million 
Salary $0 $8.975 million $3.89 
million 
$1.93 
million 
$3.79 
million 
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Section 4: Raw Data Sets 
Table 2-1 
Company Name Total 
Compensation 
Salary ROE Net 
Margin 
Annual 
Investor 
Return 
EPS Revenues 
ACE                                   
$14,831,083  
           
$1,200,000 
17% 18% 4%                                      
$7.82  
$14.15
Aflac                                         
$11,963,440  
  
$1,289,200  
19% 11% 38%                                      
$3.44  
$15.39
Allstate                                         
$10,695,367 
         
$957,596  
21% 13% -18%                                      
$8.23  
$36.75
American 
Express 
                                        
$50,126,585  
     
$1,238,461  
37% 13% -13%                                      
$3.46  
$31.56
American 
International 
Group 
                                        
$13,930,361  
     
$1,000,000  
6% 6% -18%                                      
$2.45  
$110.06  
Ameriprise 
Financial 
                                        
$23,053,075  
         
$850,000  
10% 9% 2%                                      
$3.57  
$8.65
Aon                                         
$10,300,260  
     
$1,500,000  
     
BB&T                                           
$5,938,268  
       
$965,250 
14% 16% -27%                                      
$3.18  
$10.67
Bank of 
America 
                                        
$20,404,009  
     
$1,500,000  
11% 13% -19%                                      
$3.33  
$119.19  
CME Group                                           
$3,589,940  
       
$850,000  
10% 38% 35%                                    
$12.36  
$1.76
Capital One 
Financial 
                                     
$170,699,585 
                              
-   
6% 14% -38%                                      
$4.21  
$19.13
Charles Schwab                                            
$8,162,865  
       
$900,000  
     
Chubb                                         
$12,938,957  
     
$1,275,000  
20% 20% 5%                                      
$7.49  
$14.11
Citigroup                                           
$3,164,320  
       
$250,000  
3% 2% -45%                                      
$0.72  
$159.23  
Fifth Third 
Bancorp 
                                        
$10,030,801  
         
$866,534  
11% 13% -35%                                      
$2.02  
$8.49
Franklin 
Resources 
                                        
$12,691,338  
         
$780,132  
25% 27% 21%                                      
$7.22  
$6.63
Goldman Sachs 
Group 
                                        
$53,965,418  
         
$600,000  
29% 13% 17%                                    
$29.20  
$87.97  
Hartford 
Financial 
Services Group 
                                        
$10,481,574  
     
$1,150,000  
16% 11% -5%                                      
$9.40  
$25.92
JPMorgan 
Chase 
                                        
$28,856,330  
     
$1,000,000  
13% 13% -7%                                      
$4.56  
$116.35  
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Lincoln National                                         
$16,345,139  
         
$929,231  
10% 13% -11%                                      
$4.60  
$10.59
Loews                                           
$4,195,024  
   
$1,275,000  
15% 14% 22%                                      
$4.70  
$18.38
Marsh & 
McLennan 
Companies 
                                          
$6,033,862  
   
$1,000,000  
36% 5% -11%                                      
$4.76  
$11.35
MetLife                                         
$14,264,432  
     
$1,000,000  
12% 8% 6%                                      
$5.73  
$53.01
Morgan Stanley                                         
$41,399,010  
         
$800,000  
9% 3% -15%                                      
$2.97  
$85.33
NYSE Euronext                                           
$7,606,244  
       
$548,077  
12% 16% -9%                                      
$2.43  
$4.16
Northern Trust                                         
$14,364,657  
     
$1,087,500  
17% 14% 28%                                      
$3.29  
$5.40
Principal 
Financial Group 
                                          
$8,635,909  
   
$1,000,000  
11% 8% 19%                                      
$3.19  
$10.91
ProLogis                                           
$9,855,870  
       
$780,000  
15% 44% 7%                                      
$4.07  
$2.26
Progressive                                           
$9,184,920  
       
$750,000 
20% 8% -13%                                      
$1.74  
$14.69
Prudential 
Financial 
                                        
$18,025,198  
     
$1,000,000  
16% 11% 10%                                      
$8.24  
$34.65
Public Storage                                           
$2,321,960  
       
$865,150  
3% 24% -23%                                      
$1.30  
$1.89
Regions 
Financial 
                                        
$17,339,272  
         
$995,000  
6% 13% -34%                                      
$1.80  
$10.93
Simon Property 
Group 
                                          
$3,608,462  
       
$882,308  
12% 14% -11%                                      
$1.96  
$3.78
State Street                                         
$17,097,780  
     
$1,000,000  
14% 11% 22%                                      
$3.26  
$11.82
SunTrust Banks                                           
$4,500,194  
   
$1,000,000  
9% 12% -23%                                      
$4.60  
$13.46
T. Rowe Price 
Group 
                                          
$7,928,113  
       
$350,000 
26% 29% 41%                                      
$2.53  
$2.31
The Bank of 
New York 
Mellon 
                                        
$20,515,810  
         
$975,000 
10% 15% 19%                                      
$1.78  
$14.78
Travelers 
Companies 
                                        
$18,715,604  
     
$1,000,000  
18% 18% 2%                                      
$8.44  
$26.02
US Bancorp                                           
$5,864,202  
       
$850,032  
20% 21% -8%                                      
$2.47  
$20.31
Vornado Realty 
Trust 
                                          
$5,476,159  
   
$1,000,000  
9% 16% -26%                                      
$3.78  
$3.61
Wells Fargo                                         
$11,447,960  
         
$749,615  
17% 15% -12%                                      
$2.44  
5$3.59
 
56 
 
 
Table 2-2 
Company Name Total Compensation Salary ROE Net 
Margin 
Annual 
Investor 
Return 
EPS Revenues 
ACE Limited                                            
$15,620,587.00  
                 
$5,400,000.00  
5% -1% 13%       
$3.60  
 $ 23.23  
AFLAC Inc                                             
$15,872,272.00  
                 
$5,426,761.00  
16% 9% -22%       
$4.21  
 $ 22.17  
Allstate Corp                                   
$8,620,261.00  
                 
$2,184,942.00  
4% 2% -12%  $1.58   $ 32.65  
American Express Co                                             
$16,252,851.00  
                 
$3,942,308.00  
28% 15% 11%  $4.20   $ 32.28  
American Intl Group Inc                                               
$8,405,802.00  
                 
$3,000,000.00  
19% 26% -46%  $8.95   $ 64.24  
Ameriprise Financial                                             
$16,792,686.00  
               
$10,378,000.0  
10% 9% -13%  $4.40   $10.35  
Aon Corporation                                             
$20,783,301.00  
                 
$3,450,000.00  
12% 9% 2%  $3.09   $11.29  
BB&T Corporation                                               
$8,287,147.00  
                 
$2,076,094.00  
8% 13% -3%  $1.85   $10.00  
Bank of America Corp                                               
$1,220,234.00  
                     
$950,000.00  
1% -15% -60%  $0.13   $115.37  
CME Group Inc.                                                
$6,881,922.00  
                 
$3,295,737.00  
9% 57% -23%  
$27.28  
 $ 3.28  
Capital One Financial                                             
$14,850,675.00  
                                           11% 18% -1%  $5.61   $18.55  
Charles Schwab                                             
$10,018,919.00  
                 
$3,262,500.00  
     
Chubb Corp.                                             
$13,831,409.00  
                 
$4,912,500.00  
11% 12% 18%  $6.21   $13.59  
Citigroup Inc.                                                                
$1.00  
                                  
$1.00  
7% 11% 451%  $3.86   $102.51  
Fifth Third Bancorp                                               
$4,758,013.00  
                 
$3,144,823.00  
10% 19% -12%  $1.41   $ 6.68  
Franklin Resources                                               
$6,728,758.00  
                 
$3,410,629.00  
46% 27% -12%  $8.81   $ 7.07  
Goldman Sachs Group                                             
$14,114,080.00  
                 
$6,000,000.00  
15% 9% -46%  $8.98   $36.79  
Hartford Financial 
Svc.Gp. 
                                            
$10,505,553.00  
                 
$2,855,750.00  
3% 2% -38%  $1.31   $21.87  
JPMorgan Chase & Co.                                             
$20,776,324.00  
                 
$6,000,000.00  
11% 17% -21%  $4.97   $111.03  
Lincoln National                                              
$7,166,988.00  
                 
$3,248,888.00  
2% 3% -30%  $1.04   $10.64  
Loews Corp.                                              
$5,105,353.00  
                 
$3,700,000.00  
6% 12% -3%  $4.27   $14.13  
Marsh & McLennan                                            
$14,038,187.00  
                 
$5,650,000.00  
16% 9% 18%  $1.81   $11.53  
MetLife Inc.                                            
$13,867,854.00  
                 
$5,500,000.00  
10% 8% -29%  $5.17   $65.38  
Morgan Stanley                                             
$14,854,049.00  
                 
$4,680,000.00  
14% 10% -45%  $2.37  $39.91  
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NYSE Euronext                                               
$7,058,040.00  
                 
$3,375,000.00  
9% 14% -10%  $2.40  $ 4.55  
Northern Trust Corp.                                               
$9,453,179.00  
                 
$2,900,000.00  
9% 14% -27%  $2.50   $4.17  
Principal Financial Group                                             
$6,046,944.00  
                 
$2,328,984.00  
14% 8% -24%  $2.37   $8.71  
ProLogis                                               
$6,203,434.00  
                 
$3,000,000.00  
-2% -14% -7%  
$(0.53) 
 $1.76  
Progressive Corp.                                               
$9,605,558.00  
                 
$2,015,625.00  
8% 7% -1%  $0.84   $7.99  
Prudential Financial                                             
$16,186,247.00  
                 
$7,575,722.00  
10% 8% -13%  $7.24   $40.38  
Public Storage                                               
$2,009,800.00  
                 
$2,000,000.00  
9% 46% 35%  $4.87   $1.81  
Regions Financial Corp.                                               
$3,306,928.00  
                     
$837,500.00  
1% 0% -39%  $0.15   $6.40  
Simon Property Group 
Inc 
                                            
$24,559,899.00  
                 
$5,000,000.00  
16% 22% 32%  $2.55   $3.42  
State Street Corp.                                             
$11,252,603.00  
                 
$4,961,058.00  
10% 19% -13%  $3.94   $10.29  
SunTrust Banks                                               
$5,816,671.00  
                 
$1,077,300.00  
3% 8% -40%  $1.35   $9.60  
T. Rowe Price Group                                               
$7,136,137.00  
                 
$5,350,000.00  
45% 25% -10%  $3.05   $3.43  
The Bank of New York 
Mellon Corp. 
                                            
$19,379,257.00  
                 
$6,610,000.00  
8% 16% -33%  $2.14   $16.08  
The Travelers Companies 
Inc. 
                                            
$19,800,171.00  
                 
$7,250,000.00  
6% 6% 8%  $3.63   $25.45  
U.S. Bancorp                                             
$16,104,276.00  
                 
$4,090,162.00  
15% 23% 1%  $2.56   $21.40  
Vornado Realty Trust                                               
$9,940,955.00  
                 
$1,005,700.00  
9% 18% -5%  $3.21   $3.22  
Wells Fargo                                             
$17,568,387.00  
                 
$6,539,847.00  
12% 18% -11%  $3.01   $87.60  
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Table 2-3 
Company Name Total 
Compensation 
2008 
Salary 
AFLAC Inc 9726895 1338200 
Allstate Corp 8343930 1040769 
American Express Co 27327318 1250000 
American Intl Group Inc 460478 0 
Ameriprise Financial 1386000 850000 
BB&T Corporation 4143218 993675 
Capital One Financial 68344 0 
Chubb Corp. 16969472 1275000 
Fifth Third Bancorp 3336063 899995 
Hartford Financial Svc.Gp. 4470496 1150000 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1000000 1000000 
Lincoln National 7809349 1000000 
Loews Corp. 6928757 1100000 
Marsh & McLennan 24962204 927083 
MetLife Inc. 22477471 1000000 
Morgan Stanley 1908522 800000 
NYSE Euronext 9175727 1000000 
Northern Trust Corp. 8379651 856250 
Principal Financial Group 4163906 737475 
Progressive Corp. 9314597 778846 
Prudential Financial 14018355 970769 
Public Storage 16961743 952543 
Regions Financial Corp. 3976796 995000 
Simon Property Group Inc 3440952 1000000 
State Street Corp. 24517276 1000000 
SunTrust Banks 8091887 1077300 
The Bank of New York Mellon 
Corp. 
14183633 993750 
The Travelers Companies Inc. 14498858 1000000 
U.S. Bancorp 8242592 900034 
Wells Fargo 9041087 878920 
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Table 2-4 
Company Name Total 
Compensation 
2012 
Salary 
AFLAC Inc 17130000 5039049 
Allstate Corp 4140000 3352800 
American Express Co 10920000 4000000 
American Intl Group Inc 7020000 3000000 
Ameriprise Financial 6440000 8975000 
BB&T Corporation 4280000 3555000 
Capital One Financial 160000 0 
Chubb Corp. 16840000 4425000 
Fifth Third Bancorp 4070000 2514988 
Hartford Financial Svc.Gp. 4710000 1100000 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 41990000 5916667 
Lincoln National 5040000 5262231 
Loews Corp. 3800000 3950000 
Marsh & McLennan 7040000 5650000 
MetLife Inc. 2690000 3833334 
Morgan Stanley 10390000 3516011 
NYSE Euronext 4910000 3750000 
Northern Trust Corp. 17680000 2556250 
Principal Financial Group 4720000 2178923 
Progressive Corp. 10450000 1987500 
Prudential Financial 11130000 7798054 
Public Storage 10450000 2750000 
Regions Financial Corp. 3400000 850000 
Simon Property Group Inc 6510000 5211538 
State Street Corp. 9210000 3608000 
SunTrust Banks 2830000 1501444 
The Bank of New York Mellon 
Corp. 
5770000 4866667 
The Travelers Companies Inc. 25480000 5500000 
U.S. Bancorp 6580000 4175037 
Wells Fargo 7930000 5900000 
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Section 5: Regression Outlays 
Table 2-8 
Company 
Name 
Total 
Compensati
on 
ROE Net 
Margi
n 
Annual 
Investo
r 
Return 
EPS Revenu
es 
2008/20
12 
ROE/Ye
ar 
Net 
Margin/Ye
ar 
Annual 
Investor 
Return/Ye
ar 
EPS/Ye
ar 
Revenues/Y
ear 
Aflac 9726895 0.191 0.106 0.38 3.44 15.39 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Allstate 8343930 0.212 0.126 -0.18 8.23 36.75 0 0 0 0 0 0 
American 
Express 
27327318 0.373 0.128 -0.13 3.46 31.56 0 0 0 0 0 0 
American 
Internatio
nal Group 
460478 0.063 0.056 -0.18 2.45 110.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ameriprise 
Financial 
1386000 0.103 0.094 0.02 3.57 8.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BB&T 4143218 0.142 0.163 -0.27 3.18 10.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Capital 
One 
Financial 
68344 0.063 0.135 -0.38 4.21 19.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chubb 16969472 0.198 0.199 0.05 7.49 14.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fifth Third 
Bancorp 
3336063 0.112 0.127 -0.35 2.02 8.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hartford 
Financial 
Services 
Group 
4470496 0.155 0.114 -0.05 9.4 25.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 
JPMorgan 
Chase 
1000000 0.129 0.132 -0.07 4.56 116.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lincoln 
National 
7809349 0.102 0.125 -0.11 4.6 10.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Loews 6928757 0.146 0.135 0.22 4.7 18.38 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Marsh & 
McLennan 
Companies 
24962204 0.363 0.047 -0.11 4.76 11.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MetLife 22477471 0.121 0.081 0.06 5.73 53.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Morgan 
Stanley 
1908522 0.094 0.03 -0.15 2.97 85.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NYSE 
Euronext 
9175727 0.116 0.155 -0.09 2.43 4.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Northern 
Trust 
8379651 0.172 0.135 0.28 3.29 5.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Principal 
Financial 
Group 
4163906 0.108 0.077 0.19 3.19 10.91 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Progressiv
e 
9314597 0.201 0.081 -0.13 1.74 14.69 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Prudential 
Financial 
14018355 0.16 0.106 0.1 8.24 34.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Public 
Storage 
16961743 0.026 0.242 -0.23 1.3 1.89 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Regions 
Financial 
3976796 0.062 0.127 -0.34 1.8 10.93 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Simon 
Property 
Group 
3440952 0.116 0.137 -0.11 1.96 3.78 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State 
Street 
24517276 0.136 0.107 0.22 3.26 11.82 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SunTrust 
Banks 
8091887 0.089
8 
0.121 -0.23 4.6 13.46 0 0 0 0 0 0 
The Bank 
of New 
York 
Mellon 
14183633 0.099 0.151 0.19 1.78 14.78 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Travelers 
Companies 
14498858 0.178 0.177 0.02 8.44 26.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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US 
Bancorp 
8242592 0.202 0.213 -0.08 2.47 20.31 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wells 
Fargo 
9041087 0.172 0.15 -0.12 2.44 53.59 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AFLAC Inc 5039049 0.16 0.0867
5 
-0.21 4.21 22.17 1 0.16 0.08675 -0.21 4.21 22.17 
Allstate 
Corp 
3352800 0.042 0.0237
5 
-0.12 1.58 32.65 1 0.042 0.02375 -0.12 1.58 32.65 
American 
Express Co 
4000000 0.282 0.1517
5 
0.10 4.2 32.28 1 0.282 0.15175 0.10 4.2 32.28 
American 
Intl Group 
Inc 
3000000 0.187 0.264 -0.46 8.95 64.24 1 0.187 0.264 -0.46 8.95 64.24 
Ameriprise 
Financial 
8975000 0.102 0.094 -0.13 4.4 10.35 1 0.102 0.094 -0.13 4.4 10.35 
BB&T 
Corporatio
n 
3555000 0.076 0.1282
5 
-0.03 1.85 10 1 0.076 0.12825 -0.03 1.85 10 
Capital 
One 
Financial 
 0.112 0.1752
5 
-0.01 5.61 18.55 1 0.112 0.17525 -0.01 5.61 18.55 
Chubb 
Corp. 
4425000 0.108 0.124 0.17 6.21 13.59 1 0.108 0.124 0.17 6.21 13.59 
Fifth Third 
Bancorp 
2514988 0.095 0.194 -0.12 1.41 6.68 1 0.095 0.194 -0.12 1.41 6.68 
Hartford 
Financial 
Svc.Gp. 
1100000 0.029 0.024 -0.38 1.31 21.87 1 0.029 0.024 -0.38 1.31 21.87 
JPMorgan 
Chase & 
Co. 
5916667 0.106 0.17 -0.20 4.97 111.03 1 0.106 0.17 -0.20 4.97 111.03 
Lincoln 
National 
5262231 0.022 0.0252
5 
-0.30 1.04 10.64 1 0.022 0.02525 -0.30 1.04 10.64 
Loews 
Corp. 
3950000 0.057 0.12 -0.03 4.27 14.13 1 0.057 0.12 -0.03 4.27 14.13 
Marsh & 
McLennan 
5650000 0.161 0.085 0.18 1.81 11.53 1 0.161 0.085 0.18 1.81 11.53 
MetLife 
Inc. 
3833334 0.101 0.0815 -0.28 5.17 65.38 1 0.101 0.0815 -0.28 5.17 65.38 
Morgan 
Stanley 
3516011 0.144 0.1045 -0.44 2.37 39.91 1 0.144 0.1045 -0.44 2.37 39.91 
NYSE 
Euronext 
3750000 0.092 0.135 -0.09 2.4 4.55 1 0.092 0.135 -0.09 2.4 4.55 
Northern 
Trust Corp. 
2556250 0.087 0.1445 -0.26 2.5 4.17 1 0.087 0.1445 -0.26 2.5 4.17 
Principal 
Financial 
Group 
2178923 0.142 0.082 -0.23 2.37 8.71 1 0.142 0.082 -0.23 2.37 8.71 
Progressiv
e Corp. 
1987500 0.082 0.065 -0.008 0.84 7.99 1 0.082 0.065 -0.008 0.84 7.99 
Prudential 
Financial 
7798054 0.1 0.0845 -0.13 7.24 40.38 1 0.1 0.0845 -0.13 7.24 40.38 
Public 
Storage 
2750000 0.088 0.46 0.35 4.87 1.81 1 0.088 0.46 0.35 4.87 1.81 
Regions 
Financial 
Corp. 
850000 0.008 -
0.0015 
-0.39 0.15 6.4 1 0.008 -0.0015 -0.39 0.15 6.4 
Simon 
Property 
Group Inc 
5211538 0.158 0.2195 0.31 2.55 3.42 1 0.158 0.2195 0.31 2.55 3.42 
State 
Street 
Corp. 
3608000 0.103 0.186 -0.12 3.94 10.29 1 0.103 0.186 -0.12 3.94 10.29 
SunTrust 
Banks 
1501444 0.027 0.0755 -0.40 1.35 9.6 1 0.027 0.0755 -0.40 1.35 9.6 
The Bank 
of New 
York 
Mellon 
Corp. 
4866667 0.077 0.1605 -0.33 2.14 16.08 1 0.077 0.1605 -0.33 2.14 16.08 
The 
Travelers 
Companies 
Inc. 
5500000 0.057 0.0565 0.08 3.63 25.45 1 0.057 0.0565 0.08 3.63 25.45 
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U.S. 
Bancorp 
4175037 0.153 0.2272
5 
0.012 2.56 21.4 1 0.153 0.22725 0.01 2.56 21.4 
Wells 
Fargo 
5900000 0.118 0.1815 -0.106 3.01 87.6 1 0.118 0.1815 -0.10 3.01 87.6 
 
 
Table 2-10 
Company Name Total Compensation 
(in 1000s) 
ROE Annual Investor 
Return 
EPS Revenues 
(in 1000s) 
Aflac 7403.105 -0.019 -0.5 -1 38200000 
Allstate -4203.93 -0.052 -0.039199719 -4.02 -14580000 
American Express -16407.318 -0.331 0.006784606 -1.88 1090000 
American International 
Group 
6559.522 0.219 0.286004619 1.75 32280000 
Ameriprise Financial 5054 0.084 -0.480575934 5.38 55590000 
BB&T 136.782 -0.04 0.137571281 1.22 -320000 
Chubb 91.656 -0.086 -0.062090212 -1.88 4440000 
Fifth Third Bancorp -129.472 -0.004 0.52868443 4.19 5100000 
Hartford Financial 
Services Group 
733.937 -0.005 -0.41 -0.42 10870000 
JPMorgan Chase 239.504 -0.1 -0.311730412 -3.25 -94480000 
Lincoln National 40990 0.004 -0.098139535 0.37 100440000 
Loews -2769.349 -0.124 -0.523514377 -3.66 -7740000 
Marsh & McLennan 
Companies 
-3128.757 -0.306 0.075359144 -0.49 2780000 
MetLife -17922.204 0.04 0.120661578 -3.92 -41480000 
Morgan Stanley -19787.471 0.007 -0.139877642 2.2 -19950000 
NYSE Euronext 8481.478 0.028 -0.355168295 -0.06 35750000 
Northern Trust -4265.727 -0.08 -0.375427435 -0.89 -850000 
Principal Financial Group 9300.349 -0.021 -0.459306576 -0.69 -6740000 
Progressive 556.094 -0.221 0.06 -2.27 -12930000 
Prudential Financial 1135.403 -0.078 -0.108959681 -7.4 -26660000 
Public Storage -2888.355 0.074 0.097743564 5.94 38490000 
Regions Financial -6511.743 0.026 0.691502104 3.07 -9120000 
Simon Property Group -576.796 -0.108 -0.283854749 -1.81 2620000 
State Street 3069.048 0.022 0.09962878 -0.71 -8400000 
SunTrust Banks -15307.276 0.0132 0.104280844 -0.66 -3170000 
The Bank of New York 
Mellon 
-5261.887 -0.072 -0.594809619 -0.43 -5180000 
Travelers Companies -8413.633 -0.101 -0.350817197 -6.3 -9940000 
US Bancorp 10981.142 -0.145 0.163259048 1.16 5140000 
Wells Fargo -1662.592 0.059 0.272867647 -1.22 17790000 
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Table 2-12 
Company Name Total 
Comp/Revenu
e Ratio 
ROE Net 
Margin 
Annual 
Investor Return 
EPS Revenues 
(in 1000s) 
Aflac 0.000632027 0.191 0.106 0.38 3.44 15390000 
Allstate 0.000227046 0.212 0.126 -0.18 8.23 36750000 
American Express 0.000865885 0.373 0.128 -0.13 3.46 31560000 
American International 
Group 
4.18388E-06 0.063 0.056 -0.18 2.45 11006000
0 
Ameriprise Financial 0.000160231 0.103 0.094 0.02 3.57 8650000 
BB&T 0.000388305 0.142 0.163 -0.27 3.18 10670000 
Chubb 4.84366E-06 0.198 0.199 0.05 7.49 14110000 
Fifth Third Bancorp 0.00199876 0.112 0.127 -0.35 2.02 8490000 
Hartford Financial 
Services Group 
0.000128706 0.155 0.114 -0.05 9.4 25920000 
JPMorgan Chase 3.84228E-05 0.129 0.132 -0.07 4.56 11635000
0 
Lincoln National 9.44287E-05 0.102 0.125 -0.11 4.6 10590000 
Loews 0.000424883 0.146 0.135 0.22 4.7 18380000 
Marsh & McLennan 
Companies 
0.000610463 0.363 0.047 -0.11 4.76 11350000 
MetLife 0.000470896 0.121 0.081 0.06 5.73 53010000 
Morgan Stanley 0.000263418 0.094 0.03 -0.15 2.97 85330000 
NYSE Euronext 0.000458779 0.116 0.155 -0.09 2.43 4160000 
Northern Trust 0.001699209 0.172 0.135 0.28 3.29 5400000 
Principal Financial 
Group 
0.000768071 0.108 0.077 0.19 3.19 10910000 
Progressive 0.000283452 0.201 0.081 -0.13 1.74 14690000 
Prudential Financial 0.00026882 0.16 0.106 0.1 8.24 34650000 
Public Storage 0.007417119 0.026 0.242 -0.23 1.3 1890000 
Regions Financial 0.001551852 0.062 0.127 -0.34 1.8 10930000 
Simon Property Group 0.001052062 0.116 0.137 -0.11 1.96 3780000 
State Street 0.000291113 0.136 0.107 0.22 3.26 11820000 
SunTrust Banks 0.001821492 0.0898 0.121 -0.23 4.6 13460000 
The Bank of New York 
Mellon 
0.000547489 0.099 0.151 0.19 1.78 14780000 
Travelers Companies 0.000545105 0.178 0.177 0.02 8.44 26020000 
US Bancorp 0.000713878 0.202 0.213 -0.08 2.47 20310000 
Wells Fargo 0.002283266 0.094 0.16 -0.26 3.78 3610000 
AFLAC Inc 0.000319649 0.172 0.15 -0.12 2.44 53590000 
Allstate Corp 0.000186739 0.16 0.0867
5 
-0.219199719 4.21 22170000 
American Express Co 0.000334456 0.042 0.0237 -0.123215394 1.58 32650000 
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5 
American Intl Group Inc 0.000217472 0.282 0.1517
5 
0.106004619 4.2 32280000 
Ameriprise Financial 0.000100249 0.187 0.264 -0.460575934 8.95 64240000 
BB&T Corporation 0.000413527 0.102 0.094 -0.132428719 4.4 10350000 
Chubb Corp. 8.62534E-06 0.112 0.1752
5 
-0.012090212 5.61 18550000 
Fifth Third Bancorp 0.001239146 0.108 0.124 0.17868443 6.21 13590000 
Hartford Financial 
Svc.Gp. 
0.000110628 0.15 0.09 -0.46 8.98 36790000 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 0.000215364 0.029 0.024 -0.381730412 1.31 21870000 
Lincoln National 0.000378186 0.106 0.17 -0.208139535 4.97 11103000
0 
Loews Corp. 0.000473684 0.022 0.0252
5 
-0.303514377 1.04 10640000 
Marsh & McLennan 0.000268931 0.057 0.12 -0.034640856 4.27 14130000 
MetLife Inc. 0.000610581 0.161 0.085 0.180661578 1.81 11530000 
Morgan Stanley 4.11441E-05 0.101 0.0815 -0.289877642 5.17 65380000 
NYSE Euronext 0.000260336 0.144 0.1045 -0.445168295 2.37 39910000 
Northern Trust Corp. 0.001079121 0.092 0.135 -0.095427435 2.4 4550000 
Principal Financial 
Group 
0.004239808 0.087 0.1445 -0.269306576 2.5 4170000 
Progressive Corp. 0.002681818 -0.02 -0.14 -0.07 -0.53 1760000 
Prudential Financial 0.001307885 0.082 0.065 -0.008959681 0.84 7990000 
Public Storage 0.000275632 0.1 0.0845 -0.132256436 7.24 40380000 
Regions Financial Corp. 0.005773481 0.088 0.46 0.351502104 4.87 1810000 
Simon Property Group 
Inc 
0.00053125 0.008 -0.0015 -0.393854749 0.15 6400000 
State Street Corp. 0.001903509 0.158 0.2195 0.31962878 2.55 3420000 
SunTrust Banks 0.000895044 0.103 0.186 -0.125719156 3.94 10290000 
The Bank of New York 
Mellon Corp. 
0.000294792 0.027 0.0755 -0.404809619 1.35 9600000 
The Travelers 
Companies Inc. 
0.000358831 0.077 0.1605 -0.330817197 2.14 16080000 
U.S. Bancorp 0.001001179 0.057 0.0565 0.083259048 3.63 25450000 
Wells Fargo 0.000307477 0.153 0.2272 0.012867647 2.56 21400000 
 
 
